At page 330 Taylor L.J. said,

These cases undoubtedly show a divergence of judicial authority as to the scope of the privilege. It is therefore important to go back to the basic principle justifying such privilege as an exception to the general rule that all relevant evidence is discoverable and admissible. That principle is that a client should be able to obtain legal advice in confidence.

Taylor L.J. then cites Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia (1876) 2 Ch.D. 644 , at pages 648 and 649 after which he continues,

Although originally confined to advice regarding litigation, the privilege was extended to non-litigious business. Nevertheless, despite that extension, the purpose and scope of the privilege is still to enable legal advice to be sought and given in confidence.

In my judgment, therefore, the test is whether the communication or other document was made confidentially for the purposes of legal advice. Those purposes have to be construed broadly.

Privilege obviously attaches to a document conveying legal advice from solicitor to client and to a specific request from the client for such advice. But it does not follow that all other communications between them lack privilege. In most solicitor and client relationships, especially where a transaction involves protracted dealings, advice may be required or appropriate on matters great or small at various stages. There will be a continuum of communication and meetings between the solicitor and client. The negotiations for a lease such as occurred in the present case are only one example.

Where information is passed by the solicitor or client to the other as part of the continuum aimed at keeping both informed so that advice may be sought and given as required, privilege will attach. A letter from the client containing information may end with such words as “please advise me what I should do.” But, even if it does not, there will usually be implied in the relationship an overall expectation that the solicitor will at each stage, whether asked specifically or not, tender appropriate advice. Moreover, legal advice is not confined to telling the client the law; it must include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant legal context.

It may be that applying this test to any series of communications might isolate occasional letters or notes which could not be said to enjoy privilege. But to be disclosable such documents must be not only privilege-free but also material and relevant.

Usually a letter which does no more than acknowledge receipt of a document or suggest a date for a meeting will be irrelevant and so non-disclosable.

In effect, therefore, the “purpose of legal advice” test will result in most communications between solicitor and client in, for example, a conveyancing transaction being exempt from disclosure, either because they are privileged or because they are immaterial or irrelevant.

Taylor L.J then cites Smith-Bird v. Blower [1939] 2 All E.R. 406 and Conlon v. Conlons Ltd. [1952] 2 All E.R. 462 concluding

It follows from this analysis that those dicta in the decided cases which appear to extend privilege without limit to all solicitor and client communication upon matters within the ordinary business of a solicitor and referable to that relationship are too wide.

It may be that the broad terms used in the earlier cases reflect the restricted range of solicitors’ activities at the time. Their role then would have been confined for the most part to that of lawyer and would not have extended to business adviser or man of affairs. To speak therefore of matters “within the ordinary business of a solicitor” would in practice usually have meant the giving of advice and assistance of a specifically legal nature.

But the range of assistance given by solicitors to their clients and of activities carried out on their behalf has greatly broadened in recent times and is still developing. Hence the need to re-examine the scope of legal professional privilege and keep it within justifiable bounds.

By contrast, the formulation adopted by Judge Paul Baker and quoted earlier in this judgment is in my view too restrictive. It suggests that a communication only enjoys privilege if it specifically seeks or conveys advice. If it does so, it is privileged, notwithstanding it may also contain “narratives of facts or other statements which in themselves would not be protected.” However, the second half of the judge’s formulation implies that all documents recording information or transactions with or without instructions or recording meetings lack privilege if they do not specifically contain or seek advice. The passage cited above from the judgment of Scott J. in Galadari’s case, 6 October 1986, is to the same effect.

In my judgment that formulation is too narrow. As indicated, whether such documents are privileged or not must depend on whether they are part of that necessary exchange of information of which the object is the giving of legal advice as and when appropriate. Accordingly, I agree with the formulation made by Master Munrow in the present case, subject to the additional words which I have placed in brackets. He said:

“Once solicitors are embarked on a conveyancing transaction they are employed to ensure that the client steers clear of legal difficulties, and communications passing in the handling of that transaction are privileged (if their aim is the obtaining of appropriate legal advice) since the whole handling is experience and legal skill in action and a document uttered during the transaction does not have to incorporate a specific piece of legal advice to obtain that privilege.”