Chief Justice Dickson said,

‘The reasons of the majority of this court in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 19 C.R.R. 308, 14 O.A.C. 335, 65 N.R. 87, summarized and expanded upon the earlier cases… in respect of the criteria which must be addressed by the proponent of a limitation on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter. It has been held that the onus of proof is on the party seeking the limitation, and the standard of proof is the civil standard, proof by a preponderance of probabilities.
Two requirements must be satisfied to establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
First, the legislative objective which the limitation is designed to promote must be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutional right. It must bear on a “pressing and substantial concern”.
Second, the means chosen to attain those objectives must be proportional or appropriate to the ends.
The proportionality requirement, in turn, normally has three aspects:
[a] the limiting measures must be carefully designed and rationally connected to the objective;
[b] they must impair the right as little as possible; and
[c] their effects must not so severely trench on individual or group rights that the legislative objective, albeit important, is nevertheless outweighed by the abridgment of rights.
The court stated that the nature of the proportionality test would vary depending on the circumstances. Both in articulating the standard of proof and in describing the criteria comprising the proportionality requirement the court has been careful to avoid rigid and inflexible standards.’

[Edited and formatted (including added square parentheses) for ease of reading.]