For the other entry see here.
Lord Reed said,
The concept of proportionality
The idea that proportionality is an aspect of justice can be traced back via Aquinas to the Nicomachean Ethics and beyond.
The development of the concept in modern times as a standard in public law derives from the Enlightenment, when the relationship between citizens and their rulers came to be considered in a new way, reflected in the concepts of the social contract and of natural rights.
As Blackstone wrote in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 9th ed (1783), vol 1, p 125, the concept of civil liberty comprises
“natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and not farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public”.
The idea that the state should limit natural rights only to the minimum extent necessary developed in Germany into a public law standard known as…or proportionality. From its origins in German administrative law, where it forms the basis of a rigorously structured analysis of the validity of legislative and administrative acts, the concept of proportionality came to be adopted in the case law of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. From the latter, it migrated to Canada, where it has received a particularly careful and influential analysis, and from Canada it spread to a number of other common law jurisdictions.
[He then deals with proportionality under EU law before moving on to the European Convention.] …
As I have mentioned, proportionality is also a concept applied by the European Court of Human Rights. As the court has often stated, inherent in the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights….
The court has described its approach to striking such a balance in different ways in different contexts, and in practice often approaches the matter in a relatively broad-brush way.
In cases concerned with A1P1, for example, the court has often asked whether the person concerned had to bear an individual and excessive burden….
The intensity of review varies considerably according to the right in issue and the context in which the question arises. Unsurprisingly, given that it is an international court, its approach to proportionality does not correspond precisely to the various approaches adopted in contracting states.
An assessment of proportionality inevitably involves a value judgment at the stage at which a balance has to be struck between the importance of the objective pursued and the value of the right intruded upon. The principle does not however entitle the courts simply to substitute their own assessment for that of the decision-maker. As I have noted, the intensity of review under EU law and the Convention varies according to the nature of the right at stake and the context in which the interference occurs. Those are not however the only relevant factors.
One important factor in relation to the Convention is that the Strasbourg court recognises that it may be less well placed than a national court to decide whether an appropriate balance has been struck in the particular national context. For that reason, in the Convention case law the principle of proportionality is indissolubly linked to the concept of the margin of appreciation. That concept does not apply in the same way at the national level, where the degree of restraint practised by courts in applying the principle of proportionality, and the extent to which they will respect the judgment of the primary decision maker, will depend on the context, and will in part reflect national traditions and institutional culture. For these reasons, the approach adopted to proportionality at the national level cannot simply mirror that of the Strasbourg court.
The approach to proportionality adopted in our domestic case law under the Human Rights Act 1998 has not generally mirrored that of the Strasbourg court. In accordance with the analytical approach to legal reasoning characteristic of the common law, a more clearly structured approach has generally been adopted, derived from case law under Commonwealth constitutions and Bills of Rights, including in particular the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of 1982. The three-limb test set out by Lord Clyde in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing  1 AC 69 , 80 has been influential:
- the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right;
- the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and
- the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.”
de Freitas was a Privy Council case concerned with fundamental rights under the constitution of Antigua and Barbuda, and the dictum drew on South African, Canadian and Zimbabwean authority. The three criteria have however an affinity to those formulated by the Strasbourg court in cases concerned with the requirement under articles 8–11 that an interference with the protected right should be necessary in a democratic society…, provided the third limb of the test is understood as permitting the primary decision-maker an area within which its judgment will be respected.
The de Freitas formulation has been applied by the House of Lords and the Supreme Court as a test of proportionality in a number of cases under the Human Rights Act . It was however observed in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department  2 AC 167 , para 19 that the formulation was derived from the judgment of Dickson CJ in R v Oakes  1 SCR 103 , and that a further element mentioned in that judgment was the need to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. That, it was said, was an aspect which should never be overlooked or discounted. That this aspect constituted a fourth criterion was noted by Lord Wilson JSC [with others], in R (Aguilar Quila) v Sec State for the Home Department  1 AC 621 , para 45.
The judgment of Dickson CJ in Oakes provides the clearest and most influential judicial analysis of proportionality within the common law tradition of legal reasoning. Its attraction as a heuristic tool is that, by breaking down an assessment of proportionality into distinct elements, it can clarify different aspects of such an assessment, and make value judgments more explicit. The approach adopted in Oakes can be summarised by saying that it is necessary to determine
(1) whether the objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a protected right,
(2) whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective,
(3) whether a less intrusive measure could have been used without unacceptably compromising the achievement of the objective, and
(4) whether, balancing the severity of the measure’s effects on the rights of the persons to whom it applies against the importance of the objective, to the extent that the measure will contribute to its achievement, the former outweighs the latter.
The first three of these are the criteria listed by Lord Clyde in de Freitas, and the fourth reflects the additional observation made in Huang . I have formulated the fourth criterion in greater detail than Lord Sumption JSC, but there is no difference of substance. In essence, the question at step four is whether the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefit of the impugned measure.
In relation to the third of these criteria, Dickson CJ made clear in R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd  2 SCR 713 , 781–782 that the limitation of the protected right must be one that
“it was reasonable for the legislature to impose”,
and that the courts were
“not called on to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones as to the place at which to draw a precise line”.
This approach is unavoidable, if there is to be any real prospect of a limitation on rights being justified: as Blackmun J once observed, a judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less drastic or a little less restrictive in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down ( Illinois State Board of Elections v Socialist Workers Party (1979) 440 US 173 , 188–189); especially, one might add, if he is unaware of the relevant practicalities and indifferent to considerations of cost. To allow the legislature a margin of appreciation is also essential if a federal system such as that of Canada, or a devolved system such as that of the United Kingdom, is to work, since a strict application of a “least restrictive means” test would allow only one legislative response to an objective that involved limiting a protected right.
In relation to the fourth criterion, there is a meaningful distinction to be drawn (as was explained by McLachlin CJ in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony  2 SCR 567 , para 76) between the question whether a particular objective is in principle sufficiently important to justify limiting a particular right (step one), and the question whether, having determined that no less drastic means of achieving the objective are available, the impact of the rights infringement is disproportionate to the likely benefits of the impugned measure (step four).